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 2 
Introduction. 
 
One of the key policy questions that has emerged in China in recent years has been 
regional disparities in economic performance. Regional policy has followed different 
stages from the early Reform and Opening Up policy that focussed on the coastal 
provinces and Beijing, to the Develop the West policy that addressed the problems of 
the poorer western provinces. More recently in 2002 the government announced the 
Revitalise the North East policy that focuses on the three provinces of North East 
China, Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning,. Regional disparities are highlighted in the 
‘One China: Four World’s’ classification that groups the country into four distinct 
income categories ranging from cities with an average income per capita of a middle-
income country to the the poor provinces of west and central China where average 
incomes are closer to those of a low income country (Hu 2004). These various regions 
also have considerably different levels of institutional development. 
Recent theorizing on economic growth has focussed on the role of governance and 
institutions in influencing performance. Using a broad definition of governance as 
‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’ empirical 
testing of its role has focused on three ‘governance clusters’ with various indicators in 
each cluster (Kaufmann et al 2005). These focus on respectively 
- the political processes by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced 
- the capacity of governments to formulate and implement policy 
- the respect of citizens and the state for national institutions, the rule of law, 
control of corruption and so forth. 
These three clusters correspond broadly to the aspects of governance raised most 
frequently in popular discussions – democracy, government effectiveness and the rule 
of law and corruption.  
China’s recent experience poses a paradox given its relatively poor showing by most 
empirical indicators of governance and institutional development. For example, 
Keefer (2007) uses a cross country model to explain economic growth that includes a 
governance variable. For China actual growth is as much as five percentage points 
higher than predicted given its governance score and other characteristics.
1
 
In policy terms the apparent significance of governance for economic performance 
has provided the rationale for a focus on the ‘investment climate’ in different 
provinces and cities across China as a potentially important determinant of regional 
performance, with investment climate defined as set of location-specific incentives to 
production and accumulation (World Bank 2005). The investment climate and 
governance are not identical concepts although they overlap principally in the areas of 
second and third governance clusters specified above in relation to government 
effectiveness, the rule and law and control of corruption. The investment climate also 
                                                 
1
 In this analysis it is market size that appears to be the key factor in offsetting poor governance (Keefer 
2007: 217) 
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is normally defined to include a physical infrastructure dimension, which is not 
usually captured in measures of government effectiveness. 
Reforming the investment climate in different parts of China is now an important 
aspect of regional policy. Measurement of the investment climate can be carried out in 
different ways. This paper contributes to this debate by drawing on a unique database 
for large enterprises that allows an in-depth analysis of enterprise performance across 
provinces and thus allows an inference on investment climate from these results.   
The second section of the paper discusses selectively the literature on regional 
performance in China, highlighting recent contributions on the investment climate. 
The third section provides empirical estimates of province-specific effects in 
enterprise performance. The fourth section compares these with data on the regions to 
since what might explain these location-specific effects. Finally we draw some brief 
conclusions. 
 
What explains regional growth in China? 
 
There is a lengthy (English language) technical literature examining the factors that 
have caused the growth experience of the different provinces. Here to summarize we 
put forward some broadly agreed stylized facts, with some of the evidence to support 
them.
2
  
 
Much of the empirical work has been conducted within the framework of a 
neoclassical growth model that tests whether there has been income convergence 
across provinces; in other words whether there is evidence of catch-up with poorer 
provinces growing faster than richer provinces.  The precise results vary between time 
periods and the form of specification adopted with at least some studies finding 
evidence of convergence of income from the early reform in the late 1970’s until the 
early 1990’s saw a convergence of incomes, in particular as the relatively poorer 
eastern coastal provinces grew rapidly. In the more recent period since the early 
1990’s with the ‘Opening Up’ of trade and foreign investment there has been clear 
divergence.
3
 
 
Of more direct policy relevance are the control variables that are added in such 
analyses to explain growth. The key cause of the striking trend towards divergence in 
the 1990’s noted above has been the rapid growth of the coastal provinces in the 
eastern region. Two possible factors to account for this are the policy environment, 
based around the Special Economic Zones and other related incentives for foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and the favoured geography of the coastal provinces with 
easy access to the coast and thus international trading networks. One can also add 
easy access to the growth centres for overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, and Taiwan as 
a further benefit. The main attempt to disentangle these two effects finds both to have 
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 For a recent survey on regional development that also draws on a new database for empirical analysis 
on convergence, see Song (2007).  
3
 These results refer to ‘absolute’ convergence, with no qualification for other controlling factors. For 
other measures that reflect the same trend like the Gini coefficient and the Theil index, see Cai et al 
(2002). Tests for ‘conditional convergence’ range from support over a long period in Cai et al (2002) to 
only ‘hints at’ in Demurger et al (2002:457) and weak support in Jones et al (2003) for shorter periods. 
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been important in explaining the growth of the coastal region with geographical 
factors, having a slower acting but slightly more important impact up to 1998. 
(Demurger et al, 2002). In this analysis policy is capture by a crude scoring index 
determined by the type of zone in a province and the main geographical variable is the 
proportion of the population of a province living within 100 kms of the coast or a 
navigable river.  
 
Ownership of enterprises in a province also appears to have had an important impact 
on growth. The share of ‘foreign invested enterprises’ in economic activity in a 
province appears to have had a positive growth effect either directly through its 
impact on efficiency or indirectly through externalities. Conversely the share of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) in provincial activity appears to exert a negative effect, 
which may be in part due to their own inefficiencies, but in part also to the 
requirement over much of the period covered for banks to channel funds to SOEs at 
the expense of new forms of non-state enterprise. FDI inflows are partly driven by the 
incentive system on offer to foreign investors and hence are correlated with the policy 
index referred to above.
4
  
 
An important aspect of the investment climate that impacts on provincial growth has 
been shown to be the quality of provincial infrastructure, particularly roads and 
telecommunications. Infrastructure activities link provinces with the external sector 
and are a means of overcoming geographic barriers like distance to a port. In addition 
they link provinces with each other and thus stimulate inter-province trade. Good 
infrastructure can also be added as an incentive to higher FDI inflows. Low levels of 
inter-provincial trade can also be due to internal trade barriers and there is evidence 
that these still remain significant.
5
 Remaining barriers to inter-provincial trade are 
often mentioned in policy discussions on provincial growth. The most detailed 
examination of this question finds that whilst provinces in China have opened 
substantially to international trade the reverse has taken place for inter-provincial 
trade for 1987-97.
6
  
 
A few recent studies have focussed specifically on the investment climate in different 
parts of the country. Fung et al (2005) use a cross sectional regression model to 
explain FDI inflows across provinces. They control for various province 
characteristics (like income, wage and education levels) and then focus on the 
comparative importance of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure as part of the overall 
investment climate. The former refers to various infrastructure facilities in a province 
(proxied by rail kilometers and kilometers of high quality roads) and the latter to a 
range of factors such as degree of government regulation, enforcement of legal rights, 
access to finance and corruption. The soft side of institutions is represented by a 
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 Positive effects of FDI on growth are reported in Chen and Fleisher (1996) and Demurger (2001) at 
the provincial level, in Jones et al (2003) at the city level and in Mody and Wang (1997) for coastal 
provinces. Demurger et al (2002) report a negative impact of SOE share on growth. Their FDI variable 
is correlated with their policy index and is generally insignificant for this reason. 
5
 Demurger (2001) finds a composite transport density variable and a variable reflecting telephone 
access to be significant in explaining provincial growth. The impact of the transport variable is non-
linear and diminishes with increases in the variable. Earlier work by Mody and Wang (1997) for 
industry data across the coastal provinces finds a similar result with a road variable significant but with 
diminishing impact. In their analysis the telecommunications variable has positive increasing returns. 
6
 See Poncet (2003), who suggests that overall the tariff equivalent of internal barriers to trade was as 
high as 51% in 1997 and that this had risen from 37% in 1987 and 41% in 1992. 
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reform variable that is proxied simply by the share of SOEs in manufacturing output 
in each province. The results suggest the reform variable has a significantly larger 
impact on FDI from four countries - the US, Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan - than 
does physical infrastructure. Hence weak reform (as measured by a high SOE share in 
manufacturing) is associated negatively with FDI inflows for these important 
investing economies. Of the countries studied the only exception is Korea where the 
physical side of infrastructure is more significant.  
 
This approach to the soft institutional side of the investment climate is crude. A 
considerably more detailed analysis across provinces is given in World Bank (2006). 
This analyses the results of a large survey of 12,000 firms across 100 cities in China 
(roughly looking at 100 firms per city). Data are collected on firm performance and 
aspects of the investment climate at the district level in terms of both the hard and soft 
infrastructure distinction.  A range of different investment climate measures per city 
are constructed based on a combination of firms’ responses and external sources. For 
example an index of ‘government efficiency’ is constructed based on four indicators 
obtained from firms- their effective tax burden (collected taxes over value-added), 
share of entertainment and travel expenses in sales (used as proxy for corruption), 
customs efficiency (days needed for goods to pass customs) and time cost in days per 
year dealing with government bureaucracy (in relation to tax administration, public 
security, environmental protection and labour and social protection).
7
 Indicators of 
firm performance (total factor productivity growth in each firm or percentage of firms 
with foreign ownership) are explained in a regression model that includes a set of 
investment climate variables, as well as controls for firm and industry characteristics. 
An estimate of the quality of the investment climate across the 100 cities is found by 
identifying the gap between actual performance and what would be achieved in the 
hypothetical situation that for each individual investment climate variable the city 
concerned achieved the investment climate standards of the city at the 90
th
 percentile 
level. A ranking of cities can be obtained from the size of the predicted gains, with the 
larger the predicted gain the poorer the investment climate. The position of provinces 
can be derived from the data for cities within each province with considerable 
variation found across provinces by the two performance measures.  
 
Finally Wang et al (2007) have produced a ‘marketization index’ for each province 
based on an aggregation of scores under four headings – the size of the role of the 
government, the development of the non-state sector, the degree of control over 
markets and inter-regional trade, and the development of financial markets and the 
existing legal framework. Ownership plays a major role in their index with the degree 
of private, particularly foreign, ownership of enterprises interpreted as a key indicator. 
A similar approach is used by Qunhui (2004).   
   
In summary, the consensus is that what matters for relative rates of provincial growth 
are openness to foreign investment and trade, ownership and by implication 
competition, the constraints imposed by provincial geography and various aspects of 
the investment climate covering both hard and soft infrastructure. In this paper we use 
very detailed firm level data to quantify differences in performance across provinces. 
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 The variables are standardized with a zero mean. They are added to form the index and by implication 
have equal weight. It should be noted that although this index is discussed in the text it is not used in 
the regressions for firm performance, where the components of the index are entered individually as 
independent variables; see World Bank (2006) table B-1.   
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By controlling for as many firm and sector specific factors as possible we aim to 
isolate the impact of the investment climate though province dummy variables. We 
then contrast our results with other explanations of regional performance.  
  
 
Methodology 
 
In this paper we draw on annual survey data from the National Bureau of Statistics, 
Beijing on large and medium scale industrial enterprises 1995 -2002. This database in 
principle should be comprehensive although changes in definition and misrecording 
means that some observations have to be omitted and the coverage of the medium and 
large-scale sector is not fully comprehensive. However this is a large sample and in 
2002 the last year for which we have information the sample of enterprises accounted 
for over 40% of the national industrial value-added. Xiao and Weiss (2007) is the first 
effort to use this enterprise data to cast light on questions of regional policy. Full 
results of the analysis and further information on the data are given there. 
 
Here the key issue we wish to address is how far the performance gap at the enterprise 
level across the country can be explained by firm and sector specific factors and how 
far it is due to the investment climate and operating environment, which create a 
location disadvantage in some parts of the country. We use two simple performance 
indicators value-added per employee (VA/L), as a measure of productivity, and 
‘imputed profits’ to total assets (IP/TA), as a measure of returns on investment.8 
Imputed profits are calculated as value added minus the sum of wages, financial 
charges and depreciation. We prefer this to enterprises’ own accounting profits from 
their published accounts as the frequent changes in accounting practices can distort 
the underlying picture.  
 
 
We employ a fixed effects panel data regression model to the enterprise data over 
1995-2002 to isolate the different effects on performance, based on the characteristics 
of the enterprise itself, the characteristics of the sector in which it operates, time 
factors and a series of dummy variables including province specific dummies. As our 
regression results are based on a very large and representative data set with over 
44,000 firms the conclusion here should be much more robust and systematic than 
that drawn from casual observation or limited case studies. Clearly various factors can 
explain province dummies and below we discuss how our results to relate to other 
data on regional performance. 
 
Generically the model can be written as 
 
Pirjt   =   0     +   1Xit    +    2Yjt    +   3Z   +  it                      (1) 
 
where P is a performance indicator (productivity or profitability)  for firm i in region r 
and sector j at time t 
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 Although our productivity indicator is a measure of single factor productivity, since we include 
change in the capital-labour ratio in our model implicitly our sector dummies pick up total factor 
productivity effects. 
 7 
X is a vector of firm-specific factors for firm i (relating to scale of production and 
factor intensity) 
 
Y is a vector of sector-specific factors for sector j (relating to concentration and 
ownership) 
 
Z is a vector of dummy variables (relating to provinces, sectors, years and interaction 
terms) including a dummy for region r (Zr) which is the variable of interest. 
 
0  is a constant,  is an error term and t indicates annual observation. 
 
Different versions of (1) are applied in Xiao and Weiss (2007). Key variables used are 
set out below: 
 
     Dependent variables 
      
         (VA/L): value–added per worker: 
         (IP/TA): imputed profit to total assets: 
 
      Independent variables 
 
 ln(L): size of the firm (as measured by number of workers); 
 ln(Kp/L): intensity of production fixed capital (total capital assets per worker) 
 ln(Kf/L): intensity of non-production fixed capital (welfare capital per worker) 
 Ind3Concentration: Herfindal index for industry concentration at 3-digit 
industry level calculated for the sample 
 FIE_ind2MKT_Share: market share of foreign invested enterprises at 2 digit 
industry level in the sample 
 Dind2 :  Sector dummies   at 2 digit industry level 
 (Dind2)* ln(Kp/L): Interaction terms between sector dummies and capital 
intensity  
 Dtype: Ownership dummies for SOEs, private, collective, mixed, foreign and 
Hong Kong,/Taiwan, ownership.  
  Dyear: Annual dummies 1995 to 2002  
 Dplace2 : province specific dummies 
 
The main purpose of the model is to identify the performance gap between enterprises 
in various provinces after controlling for other factors that are not specific to location 
effects. In other words, the regression coefficient for a province dummy (D
place2
) 
indicates the performance gap for enterprises in that province that is specifically due 
to the location effects after controlling for enterprise scale and factor intensity, sector 
competition, ownership and other unmeasurable sector characteristics and time. 
General macro economic effects are captured through the time dummies.  
 
Scale can have an ambiguous impact on performance depending on the effect of 
economies of scale. Regarding factor intensity higher production capital per worker 
can be expected to have a positive impact on labour productivity. Social obligations of 
enterprises or ‘welfare capital’ per worker may raise productivity but may also lower 
profitability and there is the possibility of a negative impact on the profit measure.  
 8 
Sector concentration is taken as a proxy for the degree of competition so that high 
concentration implies low competition; it is hypothesized that competition has a 
positive impact on productivity but it may have a negative impact on profitability. 
Similarly the foreign ownership share in a sector is expected to have a positive impact 
on productivity both through competition and potential technological spillovers. Its 
impact on profitability is more ambiguous. The reference points with which the 
dummies are compared are SOEs for ownership, 1996 for years, textiles (sector 17) 
for sectors and Shandong for the other provinces.  
 
 
 Results  
 
 
The aim is to derive a ranking of the performance gap across all provinces that is 
specific to location effects in each province, in another words taking away the 
systematic impact from factors like scale, technology, ownership, competition and 
sector characteristics that are captured by the control variables. The coefficients on 
the province dummies give the criteria for ranking. As noted above, the reference 
province is Shandong, so that all provinces are ranked relative to Shandong. 
  
The results are shown in table 1. Table 2 groups the provincial dummies by region 
with a ranking by province. Negative coefficients indicate lower performance than in 
Shandong. The results are shown both by province and by regional groupings of 
provinces. As might be expected there is substantial variation across provinces and a 
clear tendency for provinces in the south east region to have higher dummies and 
therefore relatively stronger performance than in the rest of the country.
9
 Here we find 
the north east and north west regions performing particularly poorly, especially in 
relation to productivity. For example, for the three north-east provinces productivity 
and profitability are always below Shandong controlling for all other factors. All three 
provinces have labour productivity roughly half that of Shandong. By profitability 
Liaoning is 8.1 percentage points below, whilst Jilin and Heilongjiang are roughly 6.9 
percentage points below. In terms of national ranking out of all provinces the three 
north-east provinces have three out of the bottom four places by the productivity 
dummy. By the profitability dummy the ranking out of 28 provinces is 21 for 
Heilongjiang, 22 for Jilin, and 27 for Liaoning. Similarly for the north west region 
three of the provinces Shanxi, Shaanxi and Gansu have labour productivity almost 
50% below that of Shandong controlling for other factors. On average, profitability is 
over seven percentage points below that of Shandong for the region as a whole. These 
two regions are the part of the country where SOE presence is still relatively high.
10
 
However our analysis, which controls for structural features, including ownership, 
shows that there are other factors at work. Even allowing for a lower than average role 
for non-state or foreign –owned firms in different sectors performance is still poor in 
the north east and north west. 
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 The regional ranking is broadly in line with the results of World Bank (2006) although the latter does 
not report individual rankings by province. The exception is that the north east provinces appear 
relatively more disadvantaged in our analysis. 
10
 Both regions had a share of industrial sales taken by SOEs of over 70% in 2004 (China Statistical 
Yearbook, National Statistical Bureau, 2005).  
 9 
In other words, in these regions even if the provinces concerned were up to the 
national level in terms of ownership and competition, and had the same production 
structure as the national average they would still have substantially lower productivity 
and profitability due to their location-specific disadvantages. However, insofar as 
locational disadvantage already impacts on right hand side variables like degree of 
concentration or foreign ownership, this approach of focusing on the coefficients on 
regional dummies will understate the overall disadvantage experienced by a particular 
province. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Regression with Provincial Dummies 
    
Dependent Variable ln(VA/L)  IP/TA 
Constant  1.30122  0.0792 
  [28.06]***  [12.52]*** 
ln(L)  -0.06414  0.00106 
  [15.31]***  [1.85]* 
ln(Kp/L)  0.28366  -0.00522 
  [32.05]***  [4.31]*** 
ln(Kf/L)  0.04745  -0.00391 
  [28.46]***  [16.73]*** 
     
     
Ind3Concentration  -1.29496  -0.21125 
  [6.33]***  [7.47]*** 
FIE_ind2MKT_Share  0.37894  0.08807 
  [6.76]***  [11.40]*** 
type=Private  0.51903  0.07867 
  [26.19]***  [27.85]*** 
type=Collective  0.31659  0.04914 
  [29.14]***  [32.49]*** 
type=Mixed  0.34478  0.04058 
  [39.52]***  [33.21]*** 
type=Foreign  0.72508  0.0458 
  [32.52]***  [14.95]*** 
type=HK-Taiwan  0.54359  0.03645 
  [24.25]***  [11.82]*** 
year=1995  -0.00226  -0.00319 
  [0.33]  [3.36]*** 
year=1997  -0.03276  -0.00619 
  [4.87]***  [6.64]*** 
year=1998  -0.04339  -0.01303 
  [6.19]***  [13.36]*** 
year=1999  0.05104  -0.00378 
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  [7.06]***  [3.72]*** 
year=2000  0.13891  0.00407 
  [18.66]***  [3.88]*** 
year=2001  0.19513  0.01089 
  [25.14]***  [9.96]*** 
year=2002  0.28492  0.01723 
  [35.55]***  [15.26]*** 
place2=[11]Beijing  -0.0271  -0.06695 
  [0.80]  [14.68]*** 
place2=[12]Tianjin  -0.23176  -0.07855 
  [7.67]***  [19.46]*** 
place2=[13]Hebei  -0.20426  -0.02735 
  [8.08]***  [8.01]*** 
place2=[14]Shanxi  -0.46416  -0.05086 
  [11.52]***  [9.34]*** 
place2=[15]InnerMongolia  -0.27733  -0.04053 
  [6.59]***  [7.18]*** 
place2=[21]Liaoning  -0.49673  -0.08176 
  [20.79]***  [25.81]*** 
place2=[22]Jilin  -0.5118  -0.06894 
  [15.65]***  [15.89]*** 
place2=[23]Heilongjiang  -0.47932  -0.068 
  [15.86]***  [16.92]*** 
place2=[31]Shanghai  0.2587  -0.05346 
  [11.21]***  [17.18]*** 
place2=[32]Jiangshu  0.19219  -0.00182 
  [10.05]***  [0.70] 
place2=[33]Zhejiang  0.18485  -0.02981 
  [7.96]***  [9.47]*** 
place2=[34]Anhui  -0.16732  -0.02996 
  [5.90]***  [7.82]*** 
place2=[35]Fujian  0.18056  -0.01617 
  [5.56]***  [3.67]*** 
place2=[36]Jiangxi  -0.40699  -0.05666 
  [10.80]***  [11.11]*** 
place2=[41]Henan  -0.28665  -0.02571 
  [10.64]***  [7.05]*** 
place2=[42]Hubei  -0.11085  -0.02191 
  [4.38]***  [6.38]*** 
place2=[43]Hunan  -0.3693  -0.06432 
  [12.75]***  [16.51]*** 
place2=[44]Guangdong  0.1918  -0.04078 
  [9.39]***  [14.73]*** 
place2=[45]Guangxi  -0.12351  -0.04492 
  [3.94]***  [10.62]*** 
place2=[46]Hainan  -0.20228  -0.0663 
  [2.98]***  [7.26]*** 
place2=[50]Sichuan+Chongqing  -0.19127  -0.05423 
  [8.10]***  [17.13]*** 
place2=[52]Guizhou  -0.31665  -0.06961 
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  [5.89]***  [9.73]*** 
place2=[53]Yunnan  -0.14561  -0.06559 
  [4.09]***  [13.64]*** 
place2=[54]Tibet+Qinghai+Ningxia  -0.23178  -0.06755 
  [4.44]***  [9.79]*** 
place2=[61]Shaanxi  -0.45675  -0.07193 
  [12.70]***  [15.02]*** 
place2=[62]Ganshu  -0.48836  -0.07733 
  [8.92]***  [10.48]*** 
place2=[65]Xinjiang  -0.2995  -0.08955 
  [5.84]***  [13.10]*** 
Observations  161622  169687 
Number of Firm  43541  44552 
1. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Coefficients for ind2 and the interaction terms between ind2 and ln(Kp/L) are not 
reported here. 
4. The base for comparing the coefficients of various dummies is type=SOE, 
year=96, ind2=17, place2=[37]Shandong. 
 
 
Table 2  Province Dummies  
  
Regions/province Productivity 
dummy 
Ranking Profitability 
dummy 
Ranking 
South East     
Jiangsu 0.1922 2 -0.0018 2 
Shanghai 0.2587 1 -0.0535 11 
Zhejiang 0.1849 4 -0.0298 6 
Fujian 0.1806 5 -0.0162 3 
Guandong 0.1918 3 -0.0408 8 
Average 0.2016 3 -0.0284 6 
     
Bohai     
Shandong 0 6 0 1 
Beijing -0.0271 7 -0.0669 17 
Tianjin -0.2318 14 -0.0786 24 
Hebei -0.2043 13 -0.0274 5 
Average -0.1158 10 -0.0432 12 
     
Central     
Anhui -0.0418 8 -0.0299 7 
Henan -0.2866 16 -0.0257 4 
Hunan -0.3693 19 -0.0643 14 
Jiangxi -0.4069 20 -0.0566 13 
Average -0.2762 16 -0.0442 10 
     
North East     
Heilongjiang -0.4793 23 -0.0680 19 
Jilin -0.5118 26 -0.0689 20 
Lioaning -0.4967 25 -0.0817 25 
Average  -0.4959 25 -0.0729 21 
 12 
     
South West     
Yunnan -0.1456 10 -0.0655 15 
Guizhoi -0.3166 18 -0.0696 21 
Guangxi -0.1235 9 -0.0449 9 
Sichuan -0.1913 11 -0.0542 12 
Hainan -0.2023 12 -0.0663 16 
Average  -0.1959 12 -0.0601 15 
     
North West     
Shanxi -0.4642 22 -0.0508 10 
Shaanxi -0.4568 21 -0.0719 22 
Qinghai -0.2318 15 -0.0676 18 
Gansu -0.4884 24 -0.0773 23 
Xinjiang -0.2995 17 -0.0896 26 
Average -0.3881 20 -0.0714 20 
 
 
What explains location disadvantage? 
 
The provincial dummies from table 2 give a summary measure of provincial location 
effects after controlling for measurable variables at the enterprise level and for 
measurable and unmeasurable effects at the sector level. However it is clearly 
desirable to try to go behind these dummies to understand what is driving the process 
of locational disadvantage. We do not have adequate data to replace provincial 
dummies by accurate continuous variables in these regressions, but we can compare 
the values of the dummies with proxies for locational effects in the wider literature 
cited in the earlier section. 
 
Demurger et al (2002) provide the most ambitious attempt to disaggregate provincial 
effects by replacing provincial dummies with two continuous variables, one based on 
geography (the proportion of the population within 100 kms from the coast) and the 
other on policy (using a scoring system based on the type of Special Zones in a 
province). Demurger et al (2002) only provide an average value for the geography 
variable averaged across regions of the country. This does show that the north east 
and north west do have a low value by the geographic variable relative to most of the 
rest of the country (apart from the south west). Further testing of this is not possible, 
however in their own analysis of provincial GDP growth Demurger at al (2002: table 
9) report only a modest impact on north-east growth from geographic effects. 
 
It is possible to test for the impact of the Demurger et al (2002) policy variable on our 
dummies. Their variable is based on a score averaged over the long period 1978-98 
(Demurger et al 2002: table 4). Most provinces had introduced some form of special 
zones by the mid-1990’s with little change over the period 1990-1998. As our data 
refer to 1995-2002 we take the single year score for the policy variable for the year 
1995, although for most provinces the score is constant during the 1990’s. When the 
province dummies are regressed on this policy variable no significant relationship 
emerges and the adjusted R2 is close to zero (see table 3).  
 
Of the other factors affecting provincial growth that have been examined in the 
literature we also test for a relation between our provincial dummies and simple 
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measures of barriers to inter-provincial trade and infrastructure. Data from Poncet 
(2003 Appendix B table 2) on inter-provincial trade flows in total province absorption 
are used as a proxy for internal barriers to trade, on the crude assumption that the 
higher is the ratio of intra-province expenditure to expenditure on goods from 
elsewhere in the country the higher are internal trade barriers. There is no relation 
however between this measure and our provincial dummies, again with an adjusted 
R2 of close to zero (see table 3). 
 
We try two alternative measures of infrastructure - telephones per capita and road 
density (road length/area). There is no relationship between the provincial dummies 
and the latter variable by province. Where we do find some relation is in a regression 
of the provincial dummies on telephones per capita. The dummies are positively and 
significantly related to the former (so regional disadvantage falls with more telephone 
communications) (see table 3). Good communications are normally seen as an 
important part of the business environment so the first positive relation is not 
unexpected. It should be borne in mind that in her analysis of the impact of 
infrastructure on provincial GDP growth, Demurger (2001) finds that her 
telecommunications variable had a positive effect on provincial growth relative to the 
national average in all three of the north-east provinces. On the other hand, her 
transport variable had a negative effect in two out of the three. In both cases 
infrastructure variables are not the dominant explanation of relative provincial growth 
in the north east. 
 
Table 3 Correlation coefficients for regression of provincial dummies on explanatory 
variables. 
  
explanatory variable adjusted R2 coefficient 
policy variable Demurger 
et al (2003) 
0.05 0.99 
intra provincial trade/inter 
provincial trade Poncet 
(2003) 
-0.03 0.02 
telephone (lines) per capita 0.20 0.003** 
road density 0.02 0.02 
 
 ** Significant at 5% level 
 
A rank correlation analysis between ranking by our provincial dummies and ranking 
by the marketization index of Wang et al (2007) provides a relatively high correlation 
for productivity (0.69) and a lower one for profitability (0.53). There is total 
agreement on the top five provinces by productivity. However at the bottom end of 
the scale it is the north-west than comes out weakest by the marketization index rather 
than the north-east by our dummies. 
 
Evidence of distinctive problems in the north east and north west relative to the rest of 
the country is provided by aspects of the soft infrastructure side of the investment 
climate quantified in World Bank (2006). The north west region is the place where the 
largest average number of days spent dealing with government officials is reported by 
firms (78 days). The average is lower in the north east but there the highest national 
figure (86 days) is reported for high value firms (World Bank 2006 table II-6). The 
 14 
proxy used to elicit information on corruption (the share of travel and entertainment 
costs in sales) is higher in these two provinces than elsewhere, although the margin is 
not great (World Bank 2006 table II-8). Perhaps most revealing in terms of the 
potential for the private sector are the results that these two provinces have the lowest 
share of small private firms reporting access to bank loans and the northwest has the 
highest share of small firms (10%) reporting the expectation of having to make 
informal payments to access such loans (World Bank 2006 table II-17). Finally in 
terms of investor confidence in the future protection of their property rights nationally 
this was lowest in the north west, followed by the north east (World Bank 2006 table 
II-17).   
 
 
 Conclusions 
 
  
Our analysis has offered limited help in opening the ‘black box’ of the provincial 
dummies. The better known measures on geography and policy do not seem important 
explanations. Also the basic data on intra and inter-provincial trade flows shed little 
light. As might be expected infrastructure appears to matter, but different measures 
give conflicting results. However our results appear broadly in line what is now 
emerging from detailed firm level surveys on investment climate. Excessive 
regulation, informal payments, lack of perceived protection of property rights and 
access to finance are all critical aspects of the investment climate that will create 
location specific effects where there is significant national variation in standards.
11
 
The strength of our results is that they are based on a very detailed database of 
enterprises across the country. By controlling for enterprise characteristics, macro 
effects and structural features, including ownership and competition, we can say with 
some confidence that the relatively weak performance found in the north east and 
north west is not caused by high SOE shares in economic activity alone, but by 
features of the investment climate within the regions. Hence ownership change per se 
is not an adequate policy response to any perceived lag in regional performance. 
 
  
                                                 
11
 Recent theoretical work on fiscal decentralization provides reasons why poorer regions may be 
especially prone to arbitrary charges imposed by local officials (Tsui and Wang (2007). 
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